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Mr. Pendleton's Rainbows: On the Value of
Teaching Abroad
Kate E. Bloch*
It was the first day of class. A Department of Justice graph
depicting the number of executions performed each year in the United
States plastered the white screen at the front of the room. The hills and
valleys of the graph flatlined to zero for a number of years in the 1970s.
I asked, offhandedly, if anyone in the room could explain why. A
student raised her hand and, to my surprise, gave a highly accurate and
lucid discussion of the U.S. Supreme Court's reasoning in Furman v.
Georgia,' the case in which the Court had indeed ruled that capital
punishment as imposed was unconstitutional.
My surprise didn't stem from the fact that it was the first day of
class and there'd been no pre-class reading assignment and we hadn't
studied Furman, or, well, really anything much yet. Instead, I was
surprised because the classroom in which I stood was in the Netherlands.
I was surprised because I was teaching an introductory comparative
criminal justice course, at the undergraduate level, in a Dutch law school,
in English.2 The student who had provided the eloquent account of the
Court's reasoning was herself from Hungary.
I would have been impressed by the student's response had it
arrived in a U.S. law school classroom, all the more so had it been in a
first-year or introductory course. But to an even greater extent, I think
* 0 Kate E. Bloch, Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College
of the Law. I am grateful to my colleagues who provided valuable insights on earlier
drafts of this essay, including Margreth Barrett, Bill Dodge, Pauline Memelink, F. Pinar
Olger, Lois Weithorn, and Frank Wu, to my home institution for the gift of my time
teaching abroad, and to all the welcoming colleagues, administrators, and students at
Leiden University.
1. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
2. 1 should add that some of the students, particularly students from countries
outside of the Netherlands, had backgrounds in legal studies from educational institutions
in those countries. Moreover, "undergraduate level" is a relative term in this context.
Although this course was offered as a choice in the curriculum of a first-degree program
post high school, like a bachelor's degree in the U.S., completion of the Dutch degree
may enable students to practice law in the Netherlands.
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that my surprise reflected and resulted from my own naivetd. Beyond
knowing that Hungary didn't have capital punishment, I couldn't have
explained when and why Hungary had rejected the death penalty. In
fact, the primary reason I could furnish information on the Dutch
rejection of the death penalty was because I had researched that
information in anticipation of teaching this comparative justice course.
As must be apparent, comparative and international law were not
areas with which I had much familiarity before my experience preparing
to and teaching in the Netherlands.3 But, I had been asked by my host
institution to teach a comparative course. So, with some hesitation about
my ability to learn enough about Dutch law to stay on a par with, or, if I
were lucky, a class ahead of, my students, I sought to comply and teach
the course with at least some comparative dimensions.
That moment on the first day of class when the student responded to
my inquiry about the graph and others like it gave me an understanding
of the gift that my home institution had given me of my time teaching
abroad. These moments convinced me that teaching legal studies,
outside the country in which one has historically taught, can be of
extraordinary value. In this essay, I aim to share a bit about my
experience in the Netherlands in hopes of encouraging those domestic
legal academics, who have yet to take the risk to, at least, consider if not,
well, carpe diem.4
In addition to my naivet6 about how conversant my students might
be with U.S. doctrine, I suffered from other limitations with respect to
this enterprise of teaching in the Netherlands. I was not literate in and
did not speak Dutch. Fortunately, the Dutch population is impressively
multilingual, and English is a studied and commonly spoken second
language. In my months visiting the Netherlands, I encountered so few
adult Dutch natives who were unable to speak English that I can still
count their number on my fingers. The Dutch embrace of English also
benefited me in terms of several very useful written resources about the
3. This is particularly true of comparative and international law in continental
Europe. I had had the opportunity to learn a bit about the criminal justice system in Haiti,
where I had the privilege of teaching through the Hastings-to-Haiti partnership at L'Ecole
Supdrieure Catholique de Droit de Jrimie (ESCDROJ), a law school located in Jeremie,
Haiti, in March 2009.
4. This essay is not, of course, the first to laud the importance or value of teaching
abroad. I hope simply to extend the existing canon of literature on this topic by sharing
my experiences here. See, e.g., Katalin Kollith and Robert Laurence, Teaching Abroad:
Or, "What Would That Be in Hungarian?" 43 J. LEGAL EDuc. 85, 85 (1993) (essay
providing advice "for those who want to think and plan a bit about what their jobs will be




Dutch legal system that were available in English.5 Even the highly
informative written resources I had consulted were, however, not always
sufficient to save me from embarrassment in the classroom. This is
because there was another area in which I lacked proficiency. Although
I had read that European Court of Human Rights decisions influenced
Dutch law,6 I had not grasped the scope and significance of that
influence.
As a domestic U.S. legal academic, I have been acculturated to the
largely internal focus for U.S. legal decision-making. For example, in
2008, the U.S. Supreme Court declined to require state courts to follow
an International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruling in a case to which the
United States had been a party and where the United States had
consented to the jurisdiction of the ICJ by ratifying the Optional Protocol
of the Vienna Convention.7 The U.S. Supreme Court noted that "Article
94(1) [of the U.N. Charter] provides that '[e]ach Member of the United
Nations undertakes to comply with the decision of the [ICJ] in any case
to which it is a party.' 59 Stat. 1051.' But the Court decided "that the
phrase 'undertakes to comply' is not 'an acknowledgement that an ICJ
decision will have immediate legal effect in the courts of U.N. members,'
but rather 'a commitment on the part of U.N. members to take future
action through their political branches to comply with an ICJ decision.'" 9
5. See, e.g., P.J.P. TAK, THE DUTCH CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (2008); ERHARD
BLANKENBURG AND FREEK BRUINSMA, DUTCH LEGAL CULTURE (2d ed. 1994); FAQ
Euthanasia 2010, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, available at http://www.minbuza.nI/en/
You and the Netherlands/About theNetherlands/Ethical issues/FAQEuthanasia (last
visited Dec. 3, 2010); Search Results: Peter Tak, MINISTRY OF SECURITY AND JUSTICE,
available at http://english.wodc.nl/ (Search "Peter Tak," Follow "ob205 full text - ob205
full text") (last visited Dec. 3, 2010). Resources in English were, of course, only a
fraction of the resources that I might have been able to consult had I been literate in
Dutch.
6. A primary resource I had consulted on Dutch law had, upon further review, been
rather explicit about the relationship of instruments of international human rights and
Dutch law. Tak, Search Results: Peter Tak, MINISTRY OF SECURITY AND JUSTICE,
available at http://english.wodc.nl/ (Search "Peter Tak," Follow "ob205 full text - ob205
full text") (last visited Dec. 3, 2010), supra note 5, at 21-22; see also infra note 21.
7. Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008).
8. Medellin at 508 (quoting U.N. Charter art. 94, para. I (emphasis added by U.S.
Supreme Court)).
9. Medellin at 508 (quoting Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Respondent at 34, Medellin v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660 (2005) (Medellin I) (No. 04-5928),
2005 U.S. LEXIS 4344). The Court explained: "[W]hile treaties 'may comprise
international commitments . . . they are not domestic law unless Congress has either
enacted implementing statutes or the treaty itself conveys an intention that it be "self-
executing" and is ratified on these terms."' Medellin at 505 (quoting Igartua-De La Rosa
v. United States, 417 F.3d 145, 150 (1st Cir. 2005) (en banc) (Boudin, C. J.) (footnote
omitted)). The Court did not find that the treaty conveyed an intention that it be self-
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And subsequent to the ICJ decision at issue,' 0 "the United States gave
notice of [its] withdrawal from the Optional Protocol to the Vienna
Convention.""
Consequently, in preparing to teach this course comparing U.S. and
Dutch approaches to criminal justice, I researched Dutch criminal law
and procedure.12  I planned to compare Miranda3 with the Dutch
approach to the question of counsel during the initial police
interrogation. A book on Dutch criminal justice, published in 2008,
explained that, in the Netherlands, the accused was not entitled to
counsel during the initial substantive police interrogation.' 4 This Dutch
approach was to provide a vivid contrast with the U.S. right to counsel at
the initial police interrogation and the admonishments about counsel
required by Miranda.5  However, because I had not appreciated the
executing nor did it find that Congress had enacted implementing statutes regarding the
issue. Medellin at 506-11.
10. Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004
I.C.J. 12 (Mar. 31).
I1. Medellin at 500 (citing Letter from Condoleezza Rice, Sec'y of State, to Kofi A.
Annan, Sec'y-Gen. of the U.N.).
12. Of course, my research was constrained by my inability to read Dutch.
13. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
14. TAK, THE DUTCH CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, supra note 5, at 92. Apart from
during a "verification interrogation," in which the "police officer must ensure that the
right person has been arrested, that the arrest was lawful, and that continuation of the
arrest seems necessary," the arrestee did not have the right to have defense counsel
present during this initial police interrogation. TAK, THE DUTCH CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM, supra note 5, at 92.
The police arrest may last up to six hours, not including the hours between
midnight and nine a.m. during which the detainee can be further interrogated
about the crime allegedly committed by him.. . . In this interrogation the
suspect has no right to assistance by defense counsel. A defense counsel is not
yet assigned to him. The client can see a counsel of his own choosing after this
questioning.
TAK, THE DUTCH CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, supra note 5, at 92. The publication I had
consulted about police interrogation in the Netherlands appears to have pre-dated the
relatively recent European Court of Human Rights Grand Chamber ruling in Salduz v.
Turkey (Salduz v. Turkey, no. 36391/02 (November 2008), The Collections, EUROPEAN
COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, available at http://www.echr.coe.int/ECHR/EN/hudoc (follow
"HUDOC Database" hyperlink; then search "Salduz" under "Case Title"; then follow "I.
CASE OF SALDUZ v. TURKEY" hyperlink) (last visited Dec. 3, 2010)).
15. Although the right of a suspect to have counsel present during police
interrogation in the U.S. remains perhaps undiluted, the clarity with which police must
explain that right to a suspect in Miranda warnings prior to interrogation has been the
subject of recent U.S. Supreme Court treatment and, arguably, dilution. See Florida v.
Powell, 130 S. Ct. 1195, 1200 (2010) (finding that the following Miranda warnings
sufficiently apprised a suspect of his right to have counsel with him during the police
interrogation:
You have the right to remain silent. If you give up the right to remain silent,
anything you say can be used against you in court. You have the right to talk to
a lawyer before answering any of our questions. If you cannot afford to hire a
278 [Vol. 29:2
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impact that decisions, which were rendered by a non-Dutch court in
cases in which the Netherlands was not a party, had on Dutch domestic
criminal procedure, I had not focused on relatively recent rulings against
Turkey by the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, France.'6
Coincidentally, and in time to save me some embarrassment, a
colleague described her in-progress scholarship.' 7 She was working on a
study of relatively recent European Court of Human Rights decisions,
including Salduz v. Turkey.'8 In Salduz, the European Court of Human
Rights decided that Turkey's failure to provide access to counsel for the
accused at the initial police interrogation stage (and its use of his
statement made during that interrogation to convict him) constituted a
lawyer, one will be appointed for you without cost and before any questioning.
You have the right to use any of these rights at any time you want during this
interview.).
16. During 2009 and in 2010, following the initial ruling against Turkey (Salduz),
the European Court of Human Rights has issued, in quick succession, a substantial
number of rulings on the access to counsel issue against Turkey as well as a few rulings
on those grounds against other countries, although none appears to have been against the
Netherlands, at least as of March 3, 2010. Salduz v. Turkey, no. 36391/02 (November
2008), The Collections, EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, available at
http://www.echr.coe.int/ECHR/EN/hudoc (follow "HUDOC Database" hyperlink; then
search "Salduz" under "Case Title"; then follow "I. CASE OF SALDUZ v. TURKEY"
hyperlink) (last visited Dec. 3, 2010); F. Pinar )19er, Truth or Due Process? The Use of
Illegally Obtained Evidence in the Criminal Trial in ECHR Law 49-50 (July 25 - Aug. 1,
2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the PENN STATE INTERNATIONAL LAW
REVIEW) [hereinafter Truth or Due Process]; see also E-mail from Dr. F. Pinar Olger, to
author, (July 23, 2010, 5:57 PST) (on file with author). One of the important decisions in
the Salduz line of cases is Panovits v. Cyprus, (Panovits v. Cyprus, Application no.
4268/04, December 11, 2008) The Collections, EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS,
available at http://www.echr.coe.int/ECHR/EN/hudoc (follow "HUDOC Database"
hyperlink; then search "Panovits" under "Case Title"; then follow "1. CASE OF
PANOVITS v. CYPRUS" hyperlink) (last visited Dec. 3, 2010), a case involving the
rights of a minor to have access to counsel at the initial police interrogation. There the
Court found
that the lack of provision of sufficient information on the applicant's right to
consult a lawyer before his questioning by the police, especially given the fact
that he was a minor at the time and not assisted by his guardian during the
questioning, constituted a breach of the applicant's defence rights. The Court
moreover finds that neither the applicant nor his father acting on behalf of the
applicant had waived the applicant's right to receive legal representation prior
to his interrogation in an explicit and unequivocal manner.
Panovits T 73. The Court concluded "that there has been a violation of Article 6 of the
Convention because of the use in trial of the applicant's confession obtained in
circumstances which breached his rights to due process and thus irreparably undermined
his rights of defence." Panovits T 86.
17. Truth or Due Process, supra note 16.
18. Salduz v. Turkey, no. 36391/02 (November 2008), The Collections, EUROPEAN
COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, available at http://www.echr.coe.int/ECHR/EN/hudoc (follow
"HUDOC Database" hyperlink; then search "Saiduz" under "Case Title"; then follow "I.
CASE OF SALDUZ v. TURKEY" hyperlink) (last visited Dec. 3, 2010).
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violation of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms.' 9  The Court found that the Convention
"requires that, as a rule, access to a lawyer should be provided as from
the first interrogation of a suspect by the police....
Equally importantly, I came to understand that, based upon the
relationship between the European Court of Human Rights and Dutch
law, Dutch law would be expected to conform to the requirements of
Salduz, even though the Netherlands had not been a party in the Salduz
case.21 Precisely what those requirements are, however, has engendered
19. Id. 56-63. Turkey had not provided access to counsel for Mr. Salduz at the
initial police interrogation and "his statement to the police was used for his conviction."
Id. 1 58. Subsequent to the events in Salduz, but before the Salduz decision, Turkey had
already amended its law to provide for access to counsel at the initial interrogation stage.
Id. T 30.
20. Against this background, the Court finds that in order for the right to a fair
trial to remain sufficiently "practical and effective." . . . Article 6 § I requires
that, as a rule, access to a lawyer should be provided as from the first
interrogation of a suspect by the police, unless it is demonstrated in the light of
the particular circumstances of each case that there are compelling reasons to
restrict this right. Even where compelling reasons may exceptionally justify
denial of access to a lawyer, such restriction-whatever its justification-must
not unduly prejudice the rights of the accused under Article 6 ... (see, mutatis
mutandis, Magee, cited above, § 44). The rights of the defence will in principle
be irretrievably prejudiced when incriminating statements made during police
interrogation without access to a lawyer are used for a conviction.
Id. § 55.
21. TAK, THE DUTCH CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, supra note 5, at 34-35; P.J.P. Tak,
The Dutch Criminal Justice System: Organization and Operation WODC, (2nd ed. 2003)
available at http://english.wodc.nl/images/ob205_full%20text tcm45-57899.pdf, at 21-
22 (last visited Dec. 3, 2010) (stating that "[T]he Dutch Constitution obliges courts to
review all domestic legislation, including Acts of Parliament, with regard to their
compatibility with directly applicable provisions of international treaties to which the
Netherlands are a contracting party, such as the European Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of November 4, 1950.
All provisions in this Convention that do not need further legislative implementation
or operationalization are regarded as directly applicable. Where a Dutch statutory
provision is found to be in conflict with a directly applicable provision of the Convention,
the court must apply the provision of the Convention instead of the national
provision.... Standards on the application of directly applicable provisions of the
Convention elaborated in case-law by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) in
Strasbourg must also be applied by Dutch courts. This is not only the case with regard to
ECHR decisions ruled against the Netherlands, but also with regard to decisions ruled
against other Member-States of the Council of Europe, in as far as these decisions contain
standards regarding the provisions of the Convention. This means that apart from
decisions against the Netherlands, other decisions of the court also have an impact on
Dutch criminal procedural legislation and trial practice."); see also Truth or Due Process,
supra note 16, at 2 (noting that, "[a]t the very least, member states whose legal systems
do not provide for legal assistance in the early stages of police custody at all, will




some discussion in the Netherlands. It also appears that new legislation
may need to be enacted in order to officially conform Dutch law to those
requirements, as those requirements are interpreted by the Netherlands.2 3
In the interim, in April 2010, a prosecutorial guideline came into effect
designed to provide access for a consultation with counsel by the accused
before, although apparently not during, the initial substantive
interrogation.24
As a result of my much improved understanding of the significance
of Salduz, I undertook to reconfigure the relevant portion of my class
presentation to address the anticipated impact of Salduz and its progeny
on Dutch law and thanked my lucky stars and my informative colleague
for saving me from an awkward and embarrassing class session. (As you
already know from earlier paragraphs, my students were exceptionally
bright and informed. I don't think the Salduz decision or its implications
for Dutch domestic criminal procedure would have escaped their notice.)
The scene I've narrated echoed in various forms throughout my time
22. There apparently remains some debate about the scope of the requirements in
Salduz. A Dutch Report to the XVIIIth International Congress of Comparative Law in
the summer of 2010 indicates that the meaning of the language in Salduz, that "'access to
a lawyer should be provided as from the first interrogation of a suspect by the police' . . .
is not immediately clear." Matthias J. Borgers & Lonneke Stevens, The Use of Illegally
Gathered Evidence in the Dutch Criminal Trial (VU University Amsterdam, Working
Paper, July 15, 2010) at 16, available at http://ssm.com/abstract-1640487. The Dutch
Report explains: "The bar in particular states that the judgments should be interpreted to
mean that lawyers have a right to be present during police interrogations, which would be
a reversal of the existing case law of the ECHR in which this right is not explicitly
recognized. The Dutch Minister of Justice and Supreme Court, however, do not want to
go that far." Id. (footnote omitted). Consequently, Dutch law conformance with the
requirements of Salduz may mean that, as a general principle, the adult accused will only
have access to counsel for a consultation prior to the interrogation, rather than access
throughout the interrogation. Id.; E-mail from Dr. F. Pinar Olger, supra note 16. Two
Dutch Supreme Court cases, in particular, appear to have interpreted Salduz and its
progeny to require access to counsel for a suspect prior to initial police interrogation. E-
mail from Dr. Pauline Memelink, to author, (Aug. 25, 2010, 12:04 PM PST) (on file with
author) (citing HR I juni 2010, NJ 2010, LJN BM6231 (Neth.), HR 30 juni 2009, NJ
2009, 349 m.nt. (Neth.)). In the June 1, 2010 decision, the Dutch Supreme Court
apparently excluded evidence taken without such consultation. E-mail from Dr. Pauline
Memelink, to author, (Aug. 25, 2010, 12:04 PM PST) (on file with author).
23. E-mail from Dr. F. Pinar Olger, supra note 16. New legislation relating to the
issue of access to counsel and initial police interrogations was pending in the Netherlands
as of the summer of 2010. Id. And a prosecutorial guideline, which is available in
Dutch, had been issued about access to counsel and initial police interrogations as a
temporary measure. Id; See Stcrt. 2010 4003, 1-7 (16 Mar. 2010). These may, however,
not provide access to counsel throughout the interrogation for an adult suspect, but rather
access for a consultation prior to the interrogation. A right of access to counsel prior to
interrogation and a responsibility that law enforcement inform the suspect of this right
appear to have been accepted by both the Dutch Minister of Justice and the Dutch
Supreme Court. Borgers & Stevens, supra note 22, at 16.
24. See supra notes 22-23.
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teaching in the Netherlands, with kind colleagues pointing me to critical
resources, explaining legal policy or approaches, and generally helping
me to understand facets of the Dutch legal system. Launching oneself as
a law school academic into an unfamiliar legal culture is reasonably
likely to produce some "disorienting moments." 25 But it was often these
"disorienting moments" that I found generated the most significant
opportunities for collegial camaraderie and for growth.
Learning about the Dutch system also sparked those healthy
questions of transposing ideas from theirs to ours. Two examples spring
to mind. First, U.S. courts, legislatures, and legal scholars have wrestled
with how to define the crime of attempt for many decades. 26 Much of the
debate has revolved around where to draw the line between preparation
and attempt.2 7  The traditional doctrine of attempt law in the U.S.
relegates preparation to the land of the unindictable and noncriminal.2 8
But once the accused's conduct 2 9 crosses the magic line between
preparation and attempt, the behavior becomes criminal as an attempt
and subject to prosecution. Deciding where to ink that line is often a
function of compromises among conflicting policies. 3 0 For example, one
policy promotes the need to allow law enforcement to intervene early
enough to prevent the target crime. Another cautions against
intervening too early and punishing persons who might voluntarily desist
and not actually carry through with what might have been "barely
formed criminal" inclinations.32  In U.S. legal doctrine on attempt,
generally, the result is binary; it's either the crime of attempt with its
25. See Fran Quigley, Seizing the Disorienting Moment: Adult Learning Theory and
the Teaching of Social Justice in Law School Clinics, 2 CLINICAL L. REv. 37, 51-56
(1995) (for a discussion of the adult learning theory involving "disorienting moments" in
the legal academic clinical setting).
26. JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 406 (4th ed. 2006).
27. DRESSLER, supra note 26, at 423.
28. Id. See, however, WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 537-38 (3d ed. 2000)
(footnotes omitted) (noting that, "prosecution for attempt is only one of several ways in
which the criminal law can reach conduct merely tending toward the doing of some harm
otherwise proscribed by law. The crimes of assault and burglary, which served as a
means of dealing with the most common forms of attempt prior to recognition of attempt
as a distinct crime, are still very much with us. In addition, even the most modern codes
include crimes defined in terms of conduct which is arguably of itself harmless but which
is made criminal because it is (or is very likely to be) a step toward the doing of harm.
For example, one modern code includes not only a host of possession-type crimes
(e.g., . . . possession of burglary tools with intent to commit a burglary, . . . possession of
weapons with intent to use same against another unlawfully . . . ), but also other
substantive offenses defined in terms of using certain items for a particular purpose ... or
even being in a certain place for a bad purpose.").
29. Together with the requisite mental state.





attendant criminal penalties or just preparatory behavior and not subject
to criminal liability under attempt law.
But, the Dutch have another solution. In addition to attempt, the
Dutch have a crime of "preparation." 34 In the Dutch code, attempt can
incur two-thirds the penalty of the target crime, while preparation is
generally only subject to half.35  Having a crime of preparation
authorizes police intervention and arrest to prevent the perpetration of
serious offenses at what may be a much earlier stage than would
traditional attempt doctrine. But a reduced penalty limits the
consequences for the accused when police intervene early in the chain of
conduct that may lead to the target crime. In highlighting the Dutch
approach, I do not mean to suggest that it could or should be transposed
wholesale into the U.S. system. Instead, I suggest that the Dutch
approach, which has now been in effect for more than a decade, may
deserve greater attention and analysis by legal scholars and legislatures
in the U.S. At a minimum, knowing about the Dutch approach, not just a
theoretical option, but an approach in use, can inform my teaching and
understanding of the range of options available in legal systems to deal
with the thorny question of when or how to address preparation, attempt
or attempt-like behavior.
Similarly, the Dutch have a defense of excessive self-defense. Their
Criminal Code defines this excuse defense as: "'Anyone exceeding the
limits of necessary defense, where such excess has been the direct result
of a strong emotion brought about by the attack, is not criminally
33. See, however, LAFAVE, supra note 28, describing examples of specific crimes
that may reach preparatory behavior.
34. TAK, THE DUTCH CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, supra note 5, at 76. The Dutch
formally defined the crime of preparation in 1994. Id. It is limited to preparation of
serious crimes. Id. In a published English translation from 1997, Article 46 defined
Preparation as follows:
Preparation to commit a serious offense which, by statutory definition, carries a
term of imprisonment of not less than eight years, is punishable, where the
perpetrator intentionally obtains, manufactures, imports, transits, exports or has
at his disposal, objects, substances, monies or other instruments of payment,
information carriers, concealed spaces or means of transport clearly intended
for the joint commission of the serious offense.
The Dutch Penal Code in 30 THE AMERICAN SERIES OF FOREIGN PENAL CODES. 75
(Louise Rayar and Stafford Wadsworth et. al., trans., rev. by Hans Lensing, Fred B.
Rothman & Co. 1997). A 2008 article notes that amendments subsequent to 1994 have
modified the offense somewhat, including removing the requirement of an intention for a
joint commission. Caroline M. Pelser, Preparations to Commit a Crime: The Dutch
Approach to Inchoate Offences, 4 UTRECHT L. REv. 57, 65 (2008) (addressing the
"removal of the requirement that the intended crime would be committed together with
others" and more generally providing a detailed discussion of the Dutch approach to
inchoate crimes).
35. TAK, THE DUTCH CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, supra note 5, at 76 (for a crime
carrying a life sentence, preparation reduces the punishment to fifteen years).
2010] 283
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liable."' 36 "When the unlawful attack causes strong emotions such as
rage, anger, fear or desperation, the person attacked may not react
properly by using a reasonable mode of escape."3 7 I could not help but
wonder how this defense might be applied in the context of some
domestic violence cases, particularly when the terrified accused has been
the victim of domestic violence by the deceased and uses a knife or gun
against the deceased's hands or fists, a circumstance that might be
perceived in some contexts as an excessive response.38  What might be
the consequences of this doctrine? Could this doctrine provide insight or
guidance in the U.S. struggle with some domestic violence cases? What
implications might it have if applied in other self-defense-related
contexts?
To quote the old commercial, these insights about the Dutch
criminal justice system sometimes represented for me "I should have had
a V8" moments. I could only imagine how much more there was for a
domestic U.S. legal academic to learn from the Dutch system. But even
this limited learning about the Dutch system produced that delightful
sensation of stretching professionally, making new connections, and
encouraging rusty synapses to fire anew.
Having the opportunity to teach abroad shouldn't of course just be
about what we gain from the experience, but also what we give. What
36. P.J.P. Tak, The Dutch Criminal Justice System: Organization and Operation
WODC, (2nd ed. 2003), at 45 available at http://english.wodc.nl/images/
ob205_full%20text tcm45-57899.pdf (quoting Section 41(2) of the Dutch Criminal
Code) (last visited Dec. 3, 2010).
37. Id. at 45. Excessive self-defense in the Dutch system is a complete excuse
defense. Id. If successfully invoked, the actor is exonerated. Id. This approach
furnishes an interesting comparison to the potential mitigation, rather than exoneration, of
imperfect self-defense in the U.S., in which some courts allow a mitigation of murder to a
lesser degree or form of homicide where, for instance, an actor possesses an honest but
unreasonable belief in the need for force or the particular degree of force used.
DRESSLER, supra note 26, at 249; LAFAVE, supra note 28, at 494. A comparison of
excessive self-defense to the U.S. approach to the provocation mitigation in homicide
might also be worth further investigation. For a discussion of provocation and self-
defense in various legal systems, including provocation and excessive self-defense in the
Dutch system, see Rene6 Lettow Lerner, The Worldwide Popular Revolt Against
Proportionality in Self-Defense Law, 2 J.L. ECON. & POL'Y 331 (2006) [hereinafter
Proportionality in Self-Defense Law]. See DRESSLER, supra note 26, at 571-90 (for a
discussion of the provocation mitigation in the U.S.).
38. See generally Lerner, supra note 37 (for an analysis of efforts to modify or
eliminate proportionality in self-defense law in a number of locations around the world).
The Proportionality in Self-Defense Law article uses the Dutch excessive self-defense
approach as an example of an approach in which proportionality has been modified or
eliminated. The article is primarily focused on proportionality issues in the context of
self-defense against intruders into one's dwelling or vehicle, e.g., shooting of burglars




we might bring will depend upon who we are and what our hosts might
find useful. In the criminal law/criminology department in which I found
myself, my colleagues expressed particular interest in U.S. plea
bargaining and publishing in U.S. law journals.
With respect to plea bargaining, to the extent that it involves an
accused pleading guilty to a criminal charge in a court proceeding in
exchange for possible concessions by the prosecution, to my knowledge,
it doesn't exist in the Dutch system.39 As I understand the process, the
accused simply does not plead guilty in the Dutch criminal justice court
system, period.4 0 The Dutch do have transactions. 4 1 Transactions may
be understood as a "form of diversion."42 They generally involve
financial resolutions in which the accused makes some payment or
perhaps undergoes training or does work without remuneration in lieu of
further prosecutorial pursuit of a case.4 3 Transactions are at the
discretion of the prosecutor, do not "imply that the offender admits he
has committed a criminal offense,"44 do not appear to include
incarceration as a possible condition, and do not appear to anticipate
judicial approval or involvement.4 5 Dutch and U.S. approaches to case
resolution differ in significant respects. So, with pleasure at being able
to give something back for all the guidance and information my
39. The Dutch trial system is much more streamlined than ours. Their traditional
criminal justice system involves bench rather than jury trials. They admit most hearsay,
which commonly enables presentation of cases substantially reliant on a police file that
contains sworn accounts of witness statements. TAK, THE DUTCH CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM, supra note 5, at 101. It's also possible that alternative mechanisms of case
resolution help manage the caseload.
40. The accused in the Netherlands can, of course, as in the U.S., confess to
committing the crime to the police and/or during the court trial. Id. Such a confession
may serve as evidence of guilt in the accused's trial in the Netherlands. Id.
41. TAK, THE DUTCH CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, supra note 5, at 87-88. A critique
of transactions, particularly of the 1983 expansion in the scope of cases in which the
prosecution can pursue a transaction, suggests that transactions "introduced" a system of
plea bargaining. Id. at 88. But transactions do appear to differ from plea bargaining as
practiced in many courts in the U.S., in part, as described in the text above. In addition, a
transaction is "not registered in the criminal record." Id. at 88.
42. Id. at 87.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 88.
45. Id. at 88. The Dutch also recently instituted another option for prosecutors in
certain cases, called a penal order. Id at 89. Using this, a prosecutor may actually
impose an order and/or sentence, without a court adjudication. Id The sentences and/or
orders, however, appear limited to options like compulsory work service or training
courses, fines, and probationary periods with designated instructions requiring
compliance. Id. The sentences and orders do not appear to include incarceration as an
option. Id. The alleged offender may object to the penal order. Such an objection
triggers a court trial. Id. at 89.
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colleagues had furnished, I offered a lunchtime discussion/question and
answer on plea bargaining in the U.S. criminal justice system.
Of perhaps more long-term significance for my colleagues' careers
as academics, I also offered a presentation on publishing in U.S. law
journals. Quite by chance, I learned from a colleague in the Economics
department at the University in the Netherlands that the process of
submitting to and publishing in U.S. legal journals was likely to be an
unfamiliar one to my Dutch colleagues. I came to understand that, as a
general rule, my Dutch colleagues submitted to peer-reviewed journals in
Europe. They could and did write scholarly articles in English, but many
were substantially or entirely unfamiliar with the submission process and
options for hundreds of U.S. legal journals that might supply a venue for
their scholarly endeavors. I cross my fingers and now look forward to
reading their work in the pages of familiar U.S. legal journals.
Why else might you take the risk and uproot yourself from the
comforts of your home institution and the U.S. legal system? For me, the
answer rests finally in my students' investment in their learning and the
pride, for example, they took in conducting and participating in a U.S.
style jury trial in the last class. We played by U.S. evidentiary principles
and the trial entailed opening and closing statements, direct and cross
examination, as well as objections. To my knowledge, only one of my
students was from the U.S. and spoke English as a first language. For
my Dutch students, English was probably a second language. For the
remainder of my international students-my student from St. Petersburg,
and those from Germany, Hungary, and France-English might have
been a second, third or fourth language. For many of my students,
coming from civil law, inquisitorial systems, much of the U.S.
adversarial process was, or at least had been, relatively foreign.
I sat in awe as they spoke to our jurors in opening statement, with
the prosecution telling a wonderful narrative of the events of the incident
and one of the defense counsel explaining what a privilege it was to
represent his client at a moment of historic importance in his client's life.
The witnesses had learned their roles and played them with sincerity.
The questioning was artfully constructed and impressively executed.
The objections were, on the whole, strikingly appropriate. The closings
were so persuasive that, despite a relatively extensive period of
deliberations, the jury ultimately hung, unable to resolve the question of
the guilt or innocence of the accused.
I had set the mock crime scene across the canal from the law school,
under a weeping willow tree, with the eyewitness' vantage point in front
of the law school and potentially obscured by the low hanging branches
of the willow across the water. In the penultimate class, on an overcast
afternoon, we had gone to investigate the scene (as I believe all good
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lawyers should, if possible). One student had queried whether the
lighting might have been different at the time of the event since the event
had occurred at approximately 2:45 a.m. I had responded affirmatively
and we had located various lampposts that might have been illuminated
at the time of the event. But, among the many images I carry away from
the last day of class is the one of the photograph, taken by a prosecution
team member, who bad trekked out in anticipation of the trial on a night
or early morning preceding the trial, when the lampposts were lit, of the
scene across the canal as it might really have looked on the night of the
incident in question. These were students with heart, students whose
attitude towards learning makes the jet lag and all the other adjustments,
which international travel and teaching often require, so worth it.
In the children's story, Pollyanna,46 the title character visits her
neighbor, the somewhat inwardly focused4 7 Mr. Pendleton.4 8 With his
assistance, Pollyanna discovers that his candelabra is hung with crystals
that have a prismatic effect. She delights in the multitude of rainbows
that the crystals create all over the room. Over time, Mr. Pendleton too
comes to see the world through the perspective of the light-filled prisms
and the rainbows that enchant Pollyanna. Teaching abroad was, for me,
like opening the curtains and letting the light fill the prisms. I wish the
same for you.
46. See generally ELEANOR H. PORTER, POLLYANNA (L.C. Page and Company
Publishers 1913).
47. Although Mr. Pendleton does travel.
48. In the original book, the neighbor's name is Mr. Pendleton. But, he is probably
better known by the Disney movie version of his name, Mr. Pendergast.
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